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ABSTRACT 
The overreaction hypothesis, as postulated by De Bondt and Thaler (1985) dictates that “stocks 
that have performed poorly in the past (loser stocks) tend to outperform stocks that have 
performed well in the past (winner stocks)” (DeBondt, et al., 1985). On the other hand, the 
under-reaction hypothesis argues that stock’s return shows momentum, whereby winner stocks 
continue to exhibit high returns in future periods, reflecting tendency of investors to under-
weigh the extent of new information.  The aim of this thesis is to investigate whether short-
term overreaction or under-reaction appears in the Egyptian Exchange (EGX) over the period 
of January 1998 to December 2013, making this the first attempt to test these market anomalies 
in an Arab stock market. The thesis surveys the overreaction/under-reaction literature focusing 
on the differences in methodologies and results across the various sample markets and 
timeframes. The thesis compares two standard methodologies in the literature, that of Ali et al 
(2011) and Clare & Thomas (1995), to test the overreaction/under-reaction hypothesis over 
various holding periods ranging from one week to 52 weeks. The analysis reveals that while 
short-term overreaction doesn’t exist in the Egyptian Exchange, there is statistically significant 
evidence of under-reaction for the holding periods of one to four weeks. This motivates further 
tests to establish the profitability of utilizing this evidence of under-reaction by applying a 
momentum strategy that invests in winner stocks. The results show that while a momentum 
strategy can provide significant abnormal returns of up to 0.885% over a holding period of four 
weeks, when trading costs are taken into account, the profitability of the momentum strategy 
becomes insignificant.   
The thesis further analyzes whether size of the company can explain the evidence of under-
reaction. This is done on the basis of creating portfolios with large and small capitalization 
stocks. For large capitalization stocks, an under-reaction that is statistically significant over 
holding periods from 1 to 3 weeks is found. The overall result for this thesis suggests that while 
evidence of under-reaction appears for Egyptian listed stocks, this is concentrated in large 
firms. Investor, however, cannot profit from this market anomaly by applying a momentum 
strategy since after taking into account trading costs involved in trading Egyptian stocks, the 
profitability of this strategy diminishes. 
 
Keywords: Overreaction; Under-reaction; momentum strategy; Market Efficiency; Return 
reversals; Market anomalies; Market capitalization 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview of Capital Markets 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is a controversial issue that is often disputed both 
empirically and theoretically. Fama in 1995 defined the efficient market as ”a market where 
there are large numbers of rational, profit-maximizers actively competing, with each trying to 
predict future market values of individual securities, and where important current information is 
almost freely available to all participants. In an efficient market, competition among the many 
intelligent participants leads to a situation where, at any point in time, actual prices of individual 
securities already reflect the effects of information based both on events that have already 
occurred and on events which, as of now, the market expects to take place in the future. In other 
words, in an efficient market at any point in time the actual price of a security will be a good 
estimate of its intrinsic value” (F.Fama, 1995). 
So according to the EMH, markets are rational and their prices should respond only to the arrival 
of new information that gets incorporated in prices instantaneously making it impossible for 
investors to beat or predict the market using technical or fundamental analysis.  
Fama showed evidence in favor of market efficiency. He argued that contrarian strategies don’t 
work in such type of markets because prices tend to be at their fundamental values. Further, 
Fama intensifies the random walk implication of the efficient market hypothesis which states 
that, future changes in stock prices should be un-predictable.  However, a large strand of 
academic studies since early 1980’s emerged to criticize the notion of capital market efficiency. 
These studies documented evidences of capital markets anomalies that seem to contrast the 
efficient market hypothesis. 
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“Capital market anomalies refer to situations when securities’ prices deviate or depart from the 
norm” (Iqbal, et al., 2013). These deviations indicate either market inefficiency or inadequacies 
in the underlying asset-pricing model. Anomalies could be fundamental, technical or calendar 
related, and they are either a one-time occurrence or a persistent event. Persistent anomalies are a 
concern since they could produce future outperformance of the market; however there is no 
guarantee of this.  
The number of these documented anomalies is large and continues to grow. An example of these 
growing anomalies is the “Calendar effect”, which includes the observed different behaviour of 
stock markets on different calendar days, months, or different times of the year in gener. The 
most important calendar anomalies are the January effect and the weekend effect. Another 
example of stock market anomalies could be the “small-firm effect”. This anomaly states that 
firms that are small in size (smaller capitalization) tend to outperform larger ones, this 
outperformance is driven by the company’s potential to grow and inevitably smaller companies 
business has more chance to grow, while big companies have less room for growing 
This thesis aims at testing one of these anomalies in one of the Arab stock markets, the 
“Egyptian Exchange”. The anomaly of concern here is the short-term Over/under-reaction 
hypothesis. The overreaction-first noted by DeBondt and Thaler (1985) in the US stock market-
dictates that “stocks that have underperformed the market over a period of time will outperform 
the market over a subsequent and similar time period” (DeBondt, et al., 1985). While Jegadeesh 
and Titman (JT) were the first to refer to the under-reaction patterns in returns, when they used a 
sample of stocks listed on the NYSE and AMEX, for the period between 1965 and 1989. 
The Arab Stock Markets are small in terms of market capitalization as they account for 
approximately 16 per cent
1
 of the total market capitalization of the 21 emerging markets
2
 and for 
                                                 
1
 Per cent is calculated based on information from MSCI.com (2014) 
 
2
 Emerging markets are (Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey) 
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1.76 per cent
3
 of the world’s stock market capitalization of $54.57 trillion4 in 2012 (Perry, 2013), 
and there exists to the best of my knowledge no study on short-term over/under-reaction on the 
cross-section of any of the Arab stocks markets so far. 
 This study provides insights about the dynamics of one of the Arab stock markets by examining 
the short-run over or under-reaction phenomenon in “the Egyptian Stock Exchange” using 
weekly closing prices data of all stocks listed in the exchange. The test period is from January 
1998 to December 2013, which is chosen to reflect most of the significant economic and political 
events Egypt passed by since the re-opening of the Egyptian Exchange in early 1990s. This study 
relies on combination of methodologies, and by comparing the results of the methodologies; it is 
intensified that there is an evidence of short-term under-reaction in the Egyptian Exchange,  
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. Section II will present the literature review of the 
main studies of the over/under-reaction hypothesis. Section III will present the data, and 
methodology used in this thesis. Section IV will provide the results of this empirical study and 
section V concludes with areas for future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 This ratio is calculated based on what is officially published by Mubasher.info that Arab stock exchanges  reach 
$960.2 billion on March 18,2012, and the information from the World Federation of Exchanges that total world’s 
market capitalization in 2012 is $54.57 trillion (Mubasher, 2012) 
 
4
 The Paris-based World Federation of Exchanges, an association of 52 regulated stock market exchanges around the 
world, recently released data on the world stock market capitalization for December 2012. As of December, the total 
value of world equities was $54.57 trillion 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
THE OVER AND UNDER-REACTION LITERATURE 
 
The key strand of literature in which this thesis falls tests whether market anomalies that 
contradict the efficient market hypothesis do exist. In Figure (1), a mapping of market anomalies 
in literature is summarized 
 
 
                               
 
 
 
 
 
Figure (1): Market anomalies 
 
2.1 Related Literature: Calendar-related market anomalies 
Calendar anomalies, also known as seasonal anomalies, are irregular pattern of stock returns that 
are related with a particular time period. They include the day of the week effect, turn of the 
month effect, January effect and the holiday effect. 
To study whether there are 
abnormal returns in capital markets 
The market is efficient Market anomalies do exist 
Fundamental 
market anomalies 
 
Technical market 
anomalies 
 
Calendar market 
anomalies 
 
NO Yes 
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The day of the week effect, that is also known as the weekend effect exhibits relatively larger 
Friday returns as compared to Monday returns, where Friday and Monday being the last and the 
first trading days of the week respectively. According to Nawaz and Mirza, “This is attributable 
to the trading patterns of the individual investors. However, in the recent time period a reverse 
weekend effect has been observed where Monday returns have yielded more than the Friday 
returns contributed by the change in the trading pattern of investors” (Nawaz, et al., 2012).  
The January effect is another calendar anomaly according to which stock market returns increase 
in the month of January more than in any other month. Various studies have reported “window 
dressing” by institutional investor as the reason behind what is called the January effect. For 
example, according to Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny (1991), “at the end of the 
calendar year, institutional investors may be prone to sell losers and buy winners to improve 
perceived performance” (Lakonishok, et al., 1991). As documented in the literature, size and tax 
loss selling are two other contributors to the January effect. Small size stocks tend to generate 
higher returns in January as compared to large stocks, as concluded by Haug and Hirschey 
(2006) when examining returns of the US equities. Tax loss selling phenomenon indicates that 
stocks which are expected to have low returns (losers) towards the end of the year are sold and 
stocks which are expected to have higher returns (winners) are held till the beginning of the New 
Year. These stocks are then sold in January and thereafter the loser stocks replace winner stocks 
in a portfolio. Ritter (1988) explained this behavior by quoting that “individuals apparently sell 
stocks that have declined in price in December in order to realize the tax losses, and then, they do 
not immediately reinvest all of the proceeds from these sales in other stocks, but they wait until 
January, as this January buying may be augmented by cash infusions from year-end bonuses and 
from the sales of larger firms on which long-term capital gains are being realized” (Ritter, 1988) 
 
2.2 Related Literature: Technical market anomalies 
Technical analysis is theoretically defined as using analyzing techniques to forecast future prices 
of stocks on the basis of past prices and relevant past information. If the EMH holds, these 
techniques are of no use. On the other hand, when the efficient market hypothesis does not hold, 
and when techniques as the moving average, and trading range break find their way to predict 
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future prices, we can ensure that there exist what we can call technical market anomalies. The 
existence of momentum is an evidence of this type of market anomaly. As according to 
momentum, rising asset prices will continue to rise, and falling asset prices will continue to fall. 
Consequently, in the next period, stocks that showed strong performance in the past continue to 
outperform stocks that showed poor performance in the past. Investors can make use of this 
anomaly, and make abnormal returns by implementing a momentum strategy that sells loser 
stocks and buy winner stocks.  
 
2.3 Related Literature: Fundamental market anomalies 
Fundamental anomalies state that prices of stocks do not reflect the stocks’ fair values. These 
anomalies include value anomaly, dividend yield anomaly, over/under-reaction anomaly, low 
price to earnings ratio anomaly, and low price to earnings anomaly.  
The value anomaly for example occurs as a result of investors overestimating the future earnings 
of growth companies and underestimating those of value companies (Graham, et al., 1962). As 
documented by Lakonishok, “this overestimation from individual investors perspective may be 
due to judgment errors and extrapolate past growth rates of growth stocks, on the other hand 
institutional investors that do not make judgement errors, prefer growth stocks as they appear to 
be "prudent" investments, and hence are easy to justify to sponsors” (Lakonishok, et al., 1994). 
In the coming few paragraphs the literature of overreaction and under-reaction anomaly which is 
the main focus of this thesis will be discussed in details. 
 
2.3.1 Defining the over and under-reaction hypotheses 
The Overreaction Hypothesis occurs when stock prices rise (fall) too much in response to good 
(bad) news. A manifestation of this phenomenon could be that when bad news arrives to the 
stock market regarding certain stocks, investors panic at first and start trading based on this 
misconception, consequently prices of these stocks fall sharply and lead to mispricing. Later, 
when investors realise the true extent of the news, they start to trade in the opposite direction so 
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that prices subsequently correct themselves. The opposite exactly occurs for stocks associated 
with good news; their prices tend to overshoot upon the arrival of the news because of investor’s 
misjudgement and then when investors know they were over optimistic they tend to trade in the 
opposite direction leading to price reversals to their reasonable levels. “Based on this 
“overreaction phenomenon”, the subsequent price reversal should be predictable from past 
returns data, and consequently adopting a contrarian strategy that sells winners stocks and buys 
loser ones sometimes leads to abnormal profits benefiting from this overreaction” (Ali, et al., 
2011). The under-reaction hypothesis, in contrast, is characterised by a lower than optimal 
response of the market to information. This under-reaction” of investors to newly arrived 
information stems from investors being conservative. Investors then gradually adapt to news 
recently flowing into the market, and start to incorporate their predictions into prices 
 Both over and under-reaction are important indicators of market inefficiency as they sometimes 
lead to achieving abnormal profits, which are returns that differ from the expected rate of return 
and are not a compensation for risk, through implementing either a contrarian or a momentum 
strategy. 
Supporters of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), as Harry Roberts (1967) and Fama (1970) 
consider these reactions as chance occurrences which vanish when the methodology of study is 
changed. But, on the other hand, Behavioral economists as Thaler (1990), and Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) consider over- and under-reaction, and other anomalies, as something natural. 
They claim that human mind falls prey to many biases while making a decision, as overreacting 
to private information signals and under-reacting to public information signals (Daniel, et al., 
1998). These biases, as mentioned by Kalb (2011) cause markets to show a behavior that may 
not be in complete harmony with what the standard finance theories expect.  
The over/under-reaction can be analyzed from any of two perspectives, a long-run perspective 
using monthly or yearly data or a short-run perspective using daily or weekly data. Although the 
focus in this study is on short-term stock market over/under-reaction, including the long-term 
literature is important as it provides a stronger theoretical foundation. 
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 Both the long-term and short-term perspectives are detailed in the following subsection to show 
that there is mixed evidence in the literature on whether long-term and short-term over and 
under-reaction occurs.  
 
2.3.2 Long-term overreaction 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) motivated most other research on overreaction, after being able to 
document return reversals over long horizons ranging from 3 to 5 years. The authors found using 
US data that stocks which experienced bad performance over the past three to five year period 
(losers) tend to outperform winners over the following three to five years. This implies that 
investors using a contrarian investment strategy could earn a highly significant abnormal profit. 
Zarowin (1989) examined the subsequent stock return performances of firms that have 
experienced extreme earnings years and found that losers outperform the winners by a 
statistically significant amount over the subsequent 36 months. However, he pointed out that at 
the time of portfolio formation losers were significantly smaller than the winners. But, when the 
losers were matched with the winners of the same size, there was virtually no evidence of 
differential stock return performance. Zarowin claimed that “the market does not over- react to 
extreme earnings news, and suggesting that size discrepancies between winners and losers may 
be responsible for the apparent overreaction phenomenon” (Zarowin, 1990) . Motivated by these 
findings, Zarowin re-examined DeBondt and Thaler (1985), and criticised their result. He was 
able to dismiss the overreaction phenomenon presented by them as an explanation of the size 
effect.  
A point consistent with Zarowin’s (1990) result is Clare and Thomas’s (1995) attempt to 
investigate the long-run overreaction in the UK stock market. Clare and Thomas found an 
evidence of limited economically insignificant difference in the performance of previous losers 
and previous winners over the period 1955 to 1990, moreover this limited overreaction, where 
the losers outperformed the winners, was attributed to the size effect, as they found that losers 
tended to be smaller than winners. In contrast to Zarowin (1990) and Clare and Thomas (1995), 
Dissanaike (2002) concluded that there is no evidence to suggest that the size effect explains the 
difference in the performance between winners and losers in the UK stock market. 
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Investigating this long-term overreaction anomaly in the Canadian equity market, Kryzanowski 
and Zhang (1992) documented no evidence of overreaction, rather, they found that Canadian 
stocks have tended to show evidence of momentum as investors under-react to new information 
by failing to reflect news instantaneously in their transaction prices 
As documented by Lobe and Rieks (2011), “research from several countries, such as that by 
Alonso and Rubio (1990) from Spain, da Costa (1994) from Brazil, Meyer (1994), Mun, 
Vasconcellos, and Kish (1999) and Schiereck, DeBondt, and Weber (1999) from Germany, or by 
Baytas and Cakici (1999), who examined seven developed countries, finding overreaction in all 
but the United States, shows that long-term overreaction is persistent even when the critic’s 
arguments are accounted for” (Lobe, et al., 2011). 
 
2.3.3 Short-term overreaction 
The availability of more frequent datasets from around the world motivated more recent research 
to examine the question in short-term. 
Lehmann (1990) examined whether short-term overreaction existed in the US stock market in 
weekly returns. He found evidence that "winner" and "loser" portfolios that are formed in one 
week exhibit return reversals the next week allowing short-term contrarian strategies to realize 
statistically significant profits even after accounting for bid-ask spreads and plausible 
transactions costs. This result is consistent with that of Debondt and thaler (1985) study in the 
long-term  
Similarly in the US, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) questioned whether the profitability of contrarian 
investment strategies necessarily implies stock market overreaction. They introduced a 
“decomposition process” so as to determine whether a lead/ lag effect or an overreaction to firm 
specific information is a main reason behind the short-term contrarian profits. Lo and MacKinlay 
reported less than half of the profits to overreaction and claimed that a lead/lag effect is the main 
reason behind the majority of the observed short-term contrarian profits (Lo, et al., 1990). 
Contradicting Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Jegadeesh and Titman (1995), examined the New York 
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and American stock exchanges to check whether there is any evidence for the existence and 
possible sources of short-term contrarian profits. They found that short-term contrarian profits 
are predominantly the result of an overreaction to firm specific information and not the result of 
lead/lag effects as suggested by Lo and MacKinlay. Indeed, Jegadeesh and Titman found only a 
small fraction (less than 1%) of the short-term contrarian profits are due to the lead/lag effect. In 
a follow up paper by Conrad et al. (1997), it was claimed that the significant profits due to price 
reversals of Lehmann (1990) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990) may not reflect the overreaction 
anomaly but may instead be generated entirely by market microstructure effects, such as the bid-
ask bounce (Conrad, et al., 1997) .  
In another attempt to examine the short term overreaction in New York Stock Exchange, Atkins 
and Dyl [1990] using daily data, showed that stock prices overreact in the short run, especially to 
negative information, however the magnitude of this statistically significant overreaction, is 
small compared to the bid-ask spreads observed for these stocks. Thus, this overreaction does not 
violate the EMH as it could not be exploited because of bid-ask spreads. However, Akhigbe, 
Gosnell, and Harikumar [1998] argue that bid-ask spread used by Atkins and Dyl [1990] to 
represent transaction costs does not reflect the round-trip trading costs faced by investors. So 
they addressed this shortcoming by using a more developed measure of bid-ask spread, and 
documented significant stock price reversals. They added that, “Except for the greatest losers, 
using a simple trading rule to exploit the excess profit net of transaction costs is not possible” 
(Akhigbe, et al., 1998). 
Cox & Peterson (1994) also examined the US market trying to explore the role of the bid-ask 
bounce, market liquidity, and overreaction in explaining price reversals in the three-day period 
immediately following large one-day decline. They concluded that price reversals in short term 
can be explained by “bid-ask bounce” and “degree of market liquidity”, and that overreaction 
vanishes with rising market liquidity (Cox, et al., 1994). 
Outside the US, there are fewer studies of short-term overreaction than of long-term 
overreaction.  These studies include Bowman & Iverson’s (1998) study that covered the New 
Zealand stock market. Based on empirical evidence they concluded that short term overreaction 
does exist there.  
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In the UK, Spyrou, Kassimatis, and Galariotis in their attempt to examine investor’s reaction to 
market shocks in the UK stock market in the short term for the period from 1989 to 2004 using 
daily closing prices, reported that “the market reaction to shocks for large capitalization stock 
portfolios is consistent with the Efficient Market Hypothesis. However, for medium and small 
capitalization stock portfolios their results indicate significant under-reaction to both positive and 
negative shocks for many days subsequent to a shock” (Spyrou, et al., 2007) 
 
In Japan, Bremer, Hiraki, and Sweeney (1997) documented short-term overreaction. In addition, 
Iihara, Kato and Tokunaga (2004) examined the Japanese markets for short-term overreaction 
using data from Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) and found that overreaction explains the 1-month 
return reversal in Japan.  
Several studies have been done on emerging markets such as Malaysia and Johannesburg. These 
studies have to be taken into consideration while doing anomalies test in Egypt as these countries 
are very close in structure and functioning to the Egyptian market. For example, a study that was 
done by Ali, Ahmad, and V. Anusakumar (2011) who investigated short-term overreaction in 
Bursa Malaysia and concluded that an investor could make abnormal profits that are highly 
significant especially for periods ranging between 1 and 12 weeks by implementing a short term 
contrarian strategy that buys loser stocks and sells winner stocks. In addition, their results also 
imply that this profitable contrarian strategy will yield even higher profits if focused on low-
volume stocks, as they reported an inverse relationship between trading volume and 
overreaction.  
Another study was done on Johannesburg Stock Exchange by Hsieh & Hodnett (2011). The 
authors were trying to examine the overreaction hypothesis in the JSE, and they found evidence 
of overreaction Hypothesis in South Africa for the period from period from January 1993 to 
March 2009 
Beside evidences of short-term overreaction, evidences of short-term under-reaction are also 
found. For instance, Schnusenberg & Madura (2001) investigated the short-term (daily) investor 
over- an under-reaction to market shocks for six US indexes and reported evidence of under-
reaction. “They argue that the results they found reflects a model of investor psychology in 
which investors interpret extremely positive news releases pessimistically and extremely 
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negative news releases optimistically” (Schnusenberg, et al., 2001). Another evidence of under-
reaction in the U.S. was given by Pritamani and Singal (2001). The authors found under-reaction 
to price shocks. 
 
Outside the U.S., Maher & Parikh (2011), while investigating the Indian stock market, found 
evidence of under-reaction to bad news. They added that this under-reaction is mainly 
concentrated in the medium and smaller capitalization stocks, in all periods except post-crisis.  
2.3.4 Profitability of the over and under-reaction phenomena 
Can investors make use of the over and under-reaction market anomalies? Many researches have 
dealt extensively with this issue aiming at exploring the profitability of contrarian and 
momentum strategies that follow the existence of overreaction and under-reaction respectively, 
and different results were found. For the momentum strategy, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
showed that a momentum strategy, that buys the winner stocks that performed well in the past 
and sells the losers stocks that performed poorly in the past of the previous six months, will 
realize significant abnormal profits in the US markets over the period from 1965 to 1989 if held 
for a holding period of 3- to 12-month.  
A further evidence of profitable momentum strategy in the U.S market was reported by Chan, 
Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) who documented that investors routinely under-react and, 
therefore can exploit a momentum strategy at intermediate terms of 3 to 6 months by buying 
recent winners and selling recent losers to make abnormal profits. 
McInish, et al (2008), in their attempt to test the profitability of short-term contrarian and 
momentum strategies in Asian markets found out that except for the Taiwan and Korea stock 
markets, winner portfolios experience price reversals, while loser portfolios experience 
momentum prices. However, contrarian strategy will realise significant profits only in Japan, and 
momentum strategy will yield  persistent and significant profits only in Japan and Hong Kong. 
McInish, et al (2008)  also documented in their paper that “Chui, Titman, and Wei (2003) 
reported significant momentum profits for seven out of the eight Pacific Basin countries for the 
period from (1975 to 2000). In particular, they found significant momentum profits in stocks of 
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small-capitalization, low book-to-market ratio, and high turnover companies” (McInish, et al., 
2008). 
 
Several papers demonstrate that the contrarian strategies resulting from the existence of 
overreaction anomaly could be profitable. For example, De Bondt and Thaler (1985), and Chou, 
Wei, and Chung (2007) documented highly profitable contrarian returns for US stocks and stocks 
from Tokyo stock exchange respectively.  
 
Conrad et al (1998) applied contrarian strategies to weekly transaction returns of NYSE/AMEX 
stocks and concluded that the momentum strategy usually leads to statistically significant profits 
at medium horizons, except during the 1926-1947 sub-period and that the contrarian strategy 
leads to profits at long horizons that are only statistically significant, during the 1926-1947 sub-
period. 
 
Hameed and Ting (2000), Using Malaysian stock market data examined short-term contrarian 
returns and trading volume and concluded the contrarian profits on actively and frequently traded 
securities are significantly higher than that generated from less active securities. 
 
Lee, Chan, Fatt and Kalev (2003) using weekly return data found significant short-term 
contrarian profits in the Australian markets". Further they documented that Lee, Darren D., et al 
(2003) in a follow up paper found that in Australia profits are to a great extent related to the 
market capitalization of the firm as an indicator of its size with overreaction to information that 
are specific to a firm being the major factor that contributes to short-term contrarian profits. 
However, when transaction costs are accounted for, all profits are wiped out. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Institutional Framework 
The Egyptian Exchange (previously known as the Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchange 
(CASE)), is one of the oldest stock markets established in the Middle East. The Egyptian 
Exchange traces its origins to 1883 when the Alexandria Stock Exchange was established, 
followed by the Cairo Stock Exchange in 1903. As quoted on the Egyptian Exchange website 
“Egypt adopts the vision of being the financial hub and investment gateway in the Middle East 
and North African (MENA) Region that best serves its stakeholders” (The Egyptian Exchange, 
2014). The Egyptian stock market has received increased attention in the last decade, especially 
since it was considered one of the world’s best performing stock exchanges in 2005. As per 
Standard & Poor’s and Morgan Stanley indices in 2005, Egypt surpassed any previously 
established record, and outperformed both developed and emerging markets, which pushed the 
Newsweek magazine to choose Egypt as one of the best 10 stock markets in the world for the 
year 2005. The privatization program was very successful in 2005 and the Ministry of 
Investment showed commitment to activate it through the stock exchange. The Egyptian 
Exchange back at that time reported that “nineteen privatization deals worth L.E14.9 billion, 
representing 94% of total privatization proceeds were conducted through the stock exchange 
during this year, Consequently, CASE 30 index showed an extra-ordinary performance during 
2005, recording the highest ever annual growth rate of 146% versus an increase of 135% and 
122% during 2003 and 2004, respectively” (The Egyptian Exchange, 2005). When the global 
financial crisis hit in 2008, the Egyptian Stock Exchange was in a better place compared to 
several global markets which recorded higher losses than that of EGX as announced by Merrill 
Lynch, however, CASE 30 index incurred 56% losses over the year 2008 since the Egyptian 
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market was not isolated from the global financial crisis repercussions due to asset liquidation and 
the decrease in shares value of the Egyptian companies listed in the EGX (The Egyptian 
Exchange, 2008). In 2011, the year started with a phase of unrest and political turmoil, it started 
with the 25th of January revolution,. In response to that, the Egyptian stock market had been shut 
since 27 January, after losing 18% in the two trading days before closure. The exchange opened 
again on Wednesday 23 March after closing for almost 8 weeks. On reopening, the market fell 
by a further 8.9% (BBC News, 2014) .  By the end of June 2013, the total market capitalization 
of the listed stocks culminated at LE 322 billion (The Egyptian Exchange, 2013) 
 
Figure (2): Weekly price movements in EGX30 
 
3.2 Data 
In this study, our sample involves all stocks listed on Egyptian Exchange as of 31
st 
of March 
2014. We focus on weekly prices, as well as volume, market capitalization and number of 
outstanding shares. Data of 16 years from January 1998 to December 2013 is used in this study 
and was compiled from Reuters Eikon 2013 database. Unlike previous studies that focus on 
sample cross-section of stocks listed on an exchange that are only part of an index, this study 
takes into consideration all stocks listed in the Egyptian Exchange.  
For market benchmarking, the index employed in this study is the EGX 30 (previously named 
CASE 30 Index). The start date of the index was January 2
nd
 1998, with a base value of 1000 
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points.  “EGX 30 index value is calculated in local currency terms and denominated in US 
dollars since 1998.  It includes the top 30 companies in terms of liquidity and activity. The Index 
is weighted by market capitalization and adjusted by the free float. For a company to be included 
in EGX 30 index, it must have at least 15% free float. This ensures market participants that the 
index constituents truly represent actively traded companies and that the index is a good and 
reputable measure for the Egyptian market” (The Egyptian Exchange, 2014).  
Stocks are then filtered where the least active ones are excluded. The activity here is measured 
using the same criteria the Egyptian Exchange uses to measure the activity of stocks to decide 
whether they should be included in any of the three major indices. For example, for a company 
to be included in EGX30 (includes the top 30 companies in terms of liquidity and activity), it 
must be traded at least 50% of the trading days during a specific period. For example, if the total 
number of traded days during the last six month period is 120 (5 x 4 x 6). The company must be 
traded at least 60 days during this period to join the index (The Egyptian Exchange, 2013) . To 
ensure that we have the most active stocks out of the sample, a second filtering criterion is used 
which is the turnover ratio of the stocks. Turnover ratio is the trading volume divided by the 
number of shares outstanding.  Stocks with average annual turnover ratio less than 80 % (lowest 
decile) are excluded. 
We further exclude observations around political events (the post-revolution closure of EGX for 
two months in 2011). This gives us 827 weekly observations of 184 stocks representing 84.40 
percent of the entire universe of listed securities (as per 2014 list). Appendix A and B of this 
thesis provides a summary of stocks used in this study, outlining their sector, market 
capitalization, listing date as well as descriptive statistics on their weekly returns over the sample 
period.  
 
3.3 Methodology 
As a first test of the Overreaction or under-reaction hypotheses in the Egyptian stock market, the 
same standard study techniques used by Ali et al. (2011) while testing the overreaction 
hypothesis in Bursa Malaysia are used. Afterwards, the methodology used by Clare and Thomas 
(1995) is being combined with our first methodology to check the robustness of the results. For 
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simplicity, let’s call Ali et al. (2011) methodology by” Methodology 1”, and Clare and Thomas 
(1995) by “Methodology 2” 
In both methodologies, we find the stocks’ abnormal returns, based on which stocks are ranked 
and assigned to either a portfolio of losers or to a portfolio of winners. These losers and winners 
portfolios are then held for H weeks, where H takes the value of 1,2,3,4,12,24,36, or 52. 
Cumulative average returns (CARs) are then computed for each holding period, and finally the 
average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) is computed for the winners, losers and the 
arbitrage portfolios over the formation period as well as each of the holding periods. The way we 
test the over/under-reaction hypothesis is what differentiates the two methodologies. In 
methodology 1, we simply check the ACAR for the arbitrage portfolio over the holding periods, 
whether it is positive, negative or equals to zero, and check its statistical significance as well and 
find out whether the result indicates over/under-reaction or supports the efficient market 
hypotheses. In methodology 2, we compare the means of the winner and loser portfolio returns 
by regressing the return of the arbitrage portfolio against a constant once (Test 1), and another 
time by regressing the arbitrage portfolio, against the market risk premium (Test 2).Based on the 
results (either Overreaction, under-reaction or efficient market hypothesis) we will measure the 
profitability of employing a contrarian or a momentum strategy. 
The Final analysis will involve testing the relationship between the resulted over/under-reaction 
and size of the firm as measured by its market capitalization.  
 
3.3.1 Finding stock’s abnormal returns 
First, we measure stocks weekly returns as follows: 
  
  
    
          
    
                               
 
Where Ri,t-1 is the return for stock i at week t-1, Pt-1 is the price of the stock at time t-1, and Pt-2 is 
the price of the stock at time t-2. 
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Market adjusted returns (abnormal returns) are then calculated for all stocks weekly 
   
    
    
    
    
    
                               
Where Ri,t-1 is the return for stock i at week t-1, and Rm,t-1 is the return for the market at week t-1, 
here Rm , is the return on EGX30 index. 
 
3.3.2 Portfolio formation 
Stocks are then ranked in each week based on past week’s abnormal returns. In case of finding 
stocks with the same abnormal return, a second ranking criterion is considered. It ranks stocks 
based on their past week’s trading volume. Stocks are assigned accordingly to one of two 
portfolios, either the winner portfolio or the loser portfolio. Where the top one third of stocks 
constitute the winner portfolio and the bottom one third construct the loser portfolio, we took the 
top and bottom one third of stocks to construct the portfolios instead of deciles and quintiles 
following the same concept followed by Ali et al (2011) in which they state that they did so due 
to the smaller number of stocks compared to studies in other markets (Ali, et al., 2011). 
Consequently equally weighted winner and loser portfolios are formed weekly. 
 
3.3.3 Holding periods 
The portfolios are then held for H weeks, where H takes the value of 1,2,3,4,12,24,36, or 52.  
These specific pins (1,2,3,4,12,24,36,or 52 months) are meant to account for investors with 
different time horizons. Portfolio returns are found in the formation period, and in each of the 
holding periods.  
Since we have equally weighted portfolios, we find the portfolios’ returns using the following 
formula  
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Where,         is the expected return on portfolio P, and     is the weight of stock i in the 
portfolio 
Holding periods’ returns are calculated using the cumulative average returns (CARs), which is 
the sum of abnormal returns over H weeks (where H takes the value 1,2,3,4,12,24,36, or 52). 
            
 
   
                                 
 
3.3.4 Testing the overreaction and under-reaction hypotheses 
Finally, the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) is computed for the winner and loser 
portfolios as follows: 
        
 
 
                                     
 
   
 
Where ACARp is the average CAR for portfolio P, and N represents the test periods. 
 
3.3.4.1 Applying Methodology 1 
The ACAR for the arbitrage portfolio is the difference between the ACAR for the loser and that 
of the winner (i.e. ACARLoser – ACARwinner) 
In an efficient market that difference should be zero (ACARL – ACARW=0), but in case that 
overreaction exists, this difference should be greater than zero (ACARL – ACARW>0). On the 
contrary, if (ACARL – ACARW<0), this indicates that the market under-reacts to the arrival of 
new information. 
In order to assess the statistical significance of ACAR, the t-statistic has been used which is 
calculated as follows: 
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Where,   is the standard deviation of CARs, and N is the number of test periods. 
The post 2011 Revolution period is also investigated for the existence of over and under-reaction 
using the same steps mentioned above but starting from January 2011 to December 2013, for 149 
weeks. 
 
3.3.4.2 Applying Methodology 2: 
According to Clare and Thomas (1995), if the return on the difference portfolio (Loser-winner) is 
insignificantly different from zero, the overreaction hypothesis should be rejected, and if the 
return is a significant positive value, the overreaction hypothesis is accepted.  
In this study the same two tests used by Clare and Thomas are used. Where the first test is based 
on comparing the means of the winner and loser portfolio returns by regressing the return of the 
difference portfolio against a constant. 
             
          
                                        
Where     is a constant and    is a white noise error term. 
This regression is done for t=1,2,3,4,12,24,36, or 52, which represents all the holding periods we 
have in this study. Then a simple t-test on the significance of the constant     tells us whether 
there is a difference in the performance between winner and loser stocks. 
A significant positive value for     confirms that an evidence of the overreaction. 
The second test is done by regressing the difference portfolio, against the market risk premium. 
However, due to data limitations and the difficulty of getting the risk free rate as being 
represented by Egypt’s T-bills historically since 1998, the regression is done against the market 
return. This test as quoted by Clare and Thomas (1995) “allows us to control for possible 
different exposures to systematic risk which may explain the differential returns between the 
winner and loser portfolios” (Clare, et al., 1995). 
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Where the intercept    term, is the Jensen performance index 
   represents the difference between the market beta of      
               
  
RM, is cumulative return on the EGX30 index t=1,2,3,4,12,24,36, or 52 holding periods. 
   is a white noise error term and where t represents the appropriate period after portfolio 
formation. 
 
As postulated by Clare and Thomas, “a significantly positive value for    can be seen as 
confirmation of the Overreaction Hypothesis. If    is significantly different from zero then 
differences in systematic risk explain some of the difference in returns. A significantly positive 
value for   means that losers bear more systematic risk than winners” (Clare, et al., 1995). 
 
3.3.5 Testing the relationship between over/under-reaction and Firm size 
For the second part of the analysis, we investigated the over/under-reaction hypothesis within 
each market-capitalization category, targeting to check whether our result is explained by the 
size of the firm as well as to find the relationship between the over/under-reaction hypothesis and 
firm size. 
 The market capitalization at the end of the previous week is used to sort the stocks into Large-
market capitalization stocks and Small-market capitalization stocks. Following this, stocks 
within each market-capitalization category are sorted again based on past week excess returns to 
form winner and loser portfolios. 
 
  
22 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
FINDINGS 
 
4.1 Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the total sample used is provided in Table 1. The final sample consists of 
184 stocks of those listed in the Egyptian exchange. The study covers 827 weeks. The average 
weekly return for all the 184 stocks is 0.124%, which translates to 6.67% annualized. The 
average weekly market capitalization for the stocks included in the sample is LE 1,646 millions 
and the average annual turnover ratio is  
Table 1:  Descriptive statistics for total sample 
Number of stocks 184 
Number of weeks 827 
Average weekly return (%) 0.124 
Average weekly market capitalization in LE million 1,646 
Average annual turnover ratio (%) 292.241 
 
 
4.2 Results of Methodology 1 
4.2.1 Analyzing the Whole Sample 
Table 2 presents the result of testing the overreaction or under-reaction hypotheses for the whole 
sample. The table shows the average abnormal return during the formation period for the winner, 
loser and arbitrage (loser-winner) portfolios and the average cumulative abnormal returns 
(ACAR) for the three portfolios for 8 holding periods (1,2,3,4,12,24,36,or 52). 
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Table 2:  Average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) for the whole period for the winner (W), loser (L) and loser-
winner portfolio (L-W) 
P
o
rt
fo
lio
 
 
Formation Period 
Holding Period (weeks) 
1 2 3 4 12 24 36 52 
Winners 
AVERAGE 6.459% 0.404% 0.616% 0.858% 0.884% 1.367% 1.441% 2.322% 3.443% 
t-stat 24.917** 3.330** 3.442** 3.407** 3.114** 2.590** 1.965 2.591** 3.008** 
Losers 
AVERAGE -5.541% -0.016% 0.044% 0.007% 0.053% 0.522% 1.185% 1.088% 0.908% 
t-stat -50.575** -0.102 0.188 0.027 0.176 1.025 1.631 1.200 0.787 
Arbitrage Portfolio 
AVERAGE -11.999% -0.420% -0.572% -0.850% -0.831% -0.845% -0.256% -1.233% -2.534% 
t-stat -46.74** -2.727** -2.557** -3.073** -2.845** -1.759 -0.389 -1.500 -2.495* 
** Significance at 1% level 
* Significance at 5% level  
 
For the winner portfolio, it is obvious that weekly winners exhibit price momentum. There is a 
strong positive return in week t-1, followed by statistically significant at the (1% level) positive 
returns for the holding periods from 1 to 52 weeks, except for the holding period of 24 weeks, 
where the return is significant at the (5% level). The returns for the winner portfolios are 
gradually increasing along the holding periods, until a maximum return of 3.44% is reached at 
the holding period of 52 weeks with statistical significance of at the (1% level). Hence, a return 
momentum appears to gradually increase for the winner stocks along the 8 holding periods.  
In contrast to the winner portfolios, the loser ones exhibit price reversals. They showed a strong 
negative return in the portfolio formation period that slightly increases at the holding period of 1 
week, and continued in this increasing trend till the holding period of 24 weeks then starts to 
decline for the holding periods of 36 and 52 weeks. However, the return for the loser portfolios is 
positive for all the holding periods except for the holding period of 1 week, though the returns 
are not statistically significant. 
The result states that In general, “winner” stocks display subsequent price momentum while 
“loser” stocks show price reversals. The result corroborates that of Fung, Leung, & Patterson 
(1999) who studied the profitability of implementing a trading strategy based on the one-day 
price performance in six Pacific Basin markets during the period between 1980 and 1993. In 
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general, they found that daily winners exhibit price momentum, while losers show price reversals 
during the following one to five trading days. This result may also be related to the “Uncertain 
Information Hypothesis”, claimed by Brown, Harlow, and Tinic (1988). This hypothesis states 
that investors react more strongly to bad news than to good news. Which means that winner 
stocks associated with good news will show price continuation (momentum), while loser stocks 
associated with negative news will exhibit an average abnormal return that is positive (price 
reversal). Therefore, as quoted by Fama (1998) “there is something about investor’s psychology 
that causes simultaneous under-reaction to some types of events, and overreaction to others” 
(Fama, 1998)  
The last row in Table 2 provides the ACAR for the arbitrage portfolio for each of the 8 holding 
periods, which is defined as the difference in the ACAR between the loser and winner portfolios. 
Although, we have positive returns for the loser portfolios for the holding periods from 2 to 52 
weeks, the ACAR for the arbitrage portfolio is negative which gives a sign of under-reaction. 
These negative returns for the arbitrage portfolio for all the holding periods can be attributed to 
the price continuation (momentum) of the winner portfolio. The result for the arbitrage portfolio 
is significant at the (1% level) for the holding periods from 1 to 4 weeks and for the holding 
period of 52 weeks it is significant at the (5% level). The remaining holding periods of 12, 24 
and 36 weeks the result is not significant. 
4.2.2 Post-revolution Analysis 
 In analyzing the post revolution period that consists of 149 weeks, Table 3 shows that for the 
winner portfolio there is a strong significant positive return in the portfolio formation period that 
starts to decline gradually exhibiting price reversals. The reversals are not significant for the 
holding periods from 1 to 24 weeks, however it is statistically significant at the (1% level) for the 
holding period of 36 and 52 weeks. The loser portfolio, on the contrary showed price momentum 
during the post revolution period, however the result is not significant except for the holding 
period of 36 weeks, where it is statistically significant at the (5% level), and that of  52 weeks 
where it is statistically significant at the (1% level). For the arbitrage portfolio, the results 
showed under-reaction that is not significant statistically.  
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Table 3: Average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) for the post revolution period for the winner (W), 
loser (L) and loser-winner portfolio (L-W) 
P
o
rt
fo
lio
 
 
Formation Period 
Holding Period (Weeks) 
 
1 2 3 4 12 24 36 52 
winners 
AVERAGE 4.636% 0.168% 0.165% 0.030% -0.087% -0.492% -1.415% -2.741% -5.785% 
t-stat 20.052** 0.827 0.554 0.083 -0.209 -0.696 -1.463 -2.510** -5.827** 
Losers 
AVERAGE -4.365% -0.274% -0.412% -0.455% -0.354% -0.345% -0.647% -2.272% -4.744% 
t-stat -21.389** -1.284 -1.332 -1.116 -0.746 -0.479 -0.634 -2.047* -4.673** 
Arbitrage Portfolio 
AVERAGE -9.001% -0.442% -0.577% -0.485% -0.267% 0.147% 0.768% 0.470% 1.041% 
t-stat -34.837** -1.934 -1.761 -1.164 -0.565 0.242 1.068 0.601 1.241 
** Significance at 1% level 
* Significance at 5% level  
 
The price reversals and price momentum for winner and loser portfolios respectively during the 
post revolution period can be attributed to the panic and irrationality that investors investing in 
the Egyptian exchange had after the revolution, when they try to cling to every piece of good 
news that might reduce their levels of fear and anxiety. After the revolution, Investors tend to 
attach excessively optimistic expectations with stocks associated with favorable information 
trying to benefit from every good news entering the market quickly before it goes, so they rush in 
buying stocks with good news and later on they realize they had overreacted. Consequently, 
prices return to their fundamental values. The opposite exactly occurs for stocks accompanied 
with unfavorable news. This result supports that of Brown et al. (1988) who theorized that the 
reaction of investors to good news is stronger than their reaction to bad news. 
Overall, this study documents an evidence of under-reaction in the Egyptian exchange that is 
statistically significant for the holding periods of 1 to 4 weeks. The under-reaction means that the 
momentum traders can profit by trend-Chasing. Therefore, a momentum strategy that buys 
winner stocks and sells loser stocks
5
 seems to be profitable for the holding period from 1 to 4 
weeks. However, as shown in Table 4, when we account for the prevailing fees rate in the market 
asked for by financial brokers, as well as the transaction costs levied by the Egyptian Exchange, 
                                                 
5
 Selling loser stocks is not considered here because short-selling is not allowed in Egypt 
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resulting in a 3 in a thousand (0.3%) as total trading costs for each side of the transaction, we 
found that implementing a momentum strategy will not yield significant profits. This result 
supports that of Fung, et al (1999) when they found that momentum profits disappeared when 
transaction costs were taken into account in six Pacific Basin markets. 
 
Table 4: Momentum Strategy of buying Winner portfolios before and after applying a 0.6% round-trip Transaction costs 
on periods when significant under-reaction exists 
                                                                                                                                         
**Significance at 1% level  
*Significance at the 5% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACAR 
 
Holding Period (Weeks) 
1 2 3 4 
Before trading cost 0.404% 0.616% 0.859% 0.885% 
T-test 3.330** 3.442** 3.407** 3.114** 
After trading cost -0.196% 0.016% 0.259% 0.285% 
T-test -1.610 0.092 1.026 1.003 
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4.4.3 Results of methodology 2 
As we mentioned above, we will apply Clare and Thomas’s (1995) methodology of testing the 
over/under-reaction hypothesis. By comparing the two methodologies together we can check 
whether our previous results were valid and robust 
 
Table 5: Using Clare and Thomas’s (1995) methodology of testing the over/under-reaction hypothesis. 
 
 
 
Holding Period (Weeks) 
1 2 3 4 12 24 36 52 
ACARW 0.404% 0.616% 0.858% 0.884% 1.367% 1.441% 2.322% 3.443% 
ACARL -0.016% 0.044% 0.007% 0.053% 0.522% 1.185% 1.088% 0.908% 
ACARL-W -0.420% -0.572% -0.850% -0.831% -0.845% -0.256% -1.233% -2.534% 
Te
st
 1
 
α1 -0.004 -0.006 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.003 -0.012 -0.025 
t-stat -2.727** -2.557** -3.074** -2.845** -1.759 -0.389 -1.500 -2.495* 
Te
st
 2
 
α2 -0.005 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.004 -0.011 -0.021 
t-stat -2.934** -2.751** -3.264** -2.951** -2.021* -0.550 -1.253 -1.872 
β 0.096 0.069 0.059 0.030 0.038 0.015 -0.012 -0.026 
t-stat 2.700** 1.956 1.686 0.952 1.379 0.639 -0.504 -1.152 
R
2
 0.9% 0.5% 0.3% 0.1% 0.2% 0.05% 0.03% 0.2% 
** Significance at 1% level 
* Significance at 5% level  
 
Table 5 presents results of our application of Clare and Thomas method that seem to confirm our 
original findings. The results confirm that there is an evidence of significant under-reaction in 
the Egyptian Exchange for the holding periods of 1 to 4 weeks as being clear from the significant 
(at the 1% level) negative value for   . 
Controlling for risk using Test 2, the significantly (at the 1% level) negative value for    for the 
holding periods from 1 to 4 weeks; can be seen as confirmation of the under-reaction hypothesis. 
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The significantly positive value for    for the holding period of 1 week means that losers may 
embody more systematic risk than winners.  
 
4.4.4 Investigating the Relationship between Under-reaction and Size 
In the following, we proceed to investigate the relationship between under-reaction and the 
firm’s size as measured by the market capitalization of stocks. The sample is divided into small 
and large market capitalization categories. Where the top one third of stocks constitutes the large 
market capitalization stocks and the bottom one third constructs the small market capitalization 
stocks.  
The results for the large market capitalization stocks are presented in Table 6. 
Table 6: Testing under-reaction hypothesis within large capitalization stocks 
P
o
rt
fo
lio
 
 
Formation 
Period 
Holding Period (weeks) 
 
1 2 3 4 12 24 36 52 
Winners 
ACAR 5.171% 0.087% -0.412% -0.668% -1.028% -3.001% -5.713% -8.089% -10.714% 
t-stat 9.697** 0.919 -0.823 -0.963 -1.164 -1.151 -1.326 -1.385 -1.546 
Losers 
ACAR -4.232% -0.199% -0.877% -1.190% -1.454% -3.975% -6.723% -9.507% -12.505% 
t-stat -46.399** -2.239* -1.770 -1.763 -1.669 -1.571 -1.602 -1.646 -1.827 
Arbitrage Portfolio 
ACAR -9.403% -0.286% -0.466% -0.522% -0.425% -0.974% -1.010% -1.419% -1.792% 
t-stat -17.542** -2.761** -3.309** -2.963** -2.117* -1.567 -1.414 -1.824 -2.060* 
** Significance at 1% level 
* Significance at 5% level  
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As shown in Table 6, for the large winner stocks, a strong highly significant positive return 
appears in the formation period, it starts to decline showing notable price reversals along each of 
the 8 holding periods. However, these price reversals are not significant statistically. On the 
other hand, large losers continue to have negative returns for all the holding periods. A 
significant under-reaction can be noticed for the holding period of 1, 2 and 3 weeks, as the 
difference of the ACAR between the loser and winner portfolios is negative and statistically 
significant at the (1% level). Whilst returns are negative at the holding periods of 4 to 52 weeks, 
they are only significant at the (5%level) at the holding period of 4 weeks and that of 52 weeks. 
For the rest of the holding periods none of the returns are significant.  
The average abnormal cumulative returns (ACARs) for small capitalization stocks for the 8 
holding periods are detailed in Table 7. 
Table 7: Testing under-reaction hypothesis within small capitalization stocks 
 
 
** Significance at 1% level 
* Significance at 5% level  
 
 The small winners exhibit price reversals starting from the holding period of 2 weeks up to that 
of 52 weeks, but none of which are statistically significant. Small losers exhibit price momentum 
for all of the holding periods except for the holding period of 1 week, but the results are not 
significant exactly the same as for the small winners. This yields a negative difference between 
the ACARs of the small loser and small winner stocks for the holding period from 1 to 12 weeks, 
P
o
rt
fo
lio
 
 
Formation Period Holding Period (weeks) 
  
1 2 3 4 12 24 36 52 
winners 
ACAR 5.322% 0.334% -0.157% -0.247% -0.440% -2.092% -3.539% -5.330% -5.113% 
t-stat 27.909** 2.010* -0.184 -0.193 -0.255 -0.433 -0.453 -0.493 -0.405 
Losers 
ACAR -5.367% 0.223% -0.346% -0.620% -0.898% -2.352% -3.369% -4.568% -4.671% 
t-stat -39.713** 1.467 -0.407 -0.495 -0.522 -0.492 -0.437 -0.425 -0.376 
Arbitrage Portfolio 
ACAR -10.689% -0.111% -0.188% -0.374% -0.458% -0.260% 0.169% 0.762% 0.441% 
t-stat -63.864** -0.853 -0.951 -1.527 -1.660 -0.562 0.276 1.027 0.493 
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which can be interpreted as under-reaction, however it is not statistically significant, and a 
positive difference between ACARs of the small loser and small winner stocks for the holding 
period from 24 to 52 weeks that is also not significant statistically. 
Indeed the returns are clearly more prominent for large capitalization stocks than for small ones. 
Overall, the evidence indicates that for large capitalization stock portfolios, there is a significant 
under-reaction to market shocks for a number of days subsequent to a shock up to 21 days (3 
weeks). Hence, large capitalization stocks tend to under-react more than small capitalization 
stocks and exhibit correspondingly higher return momentum. This result seems to contradict that 
of Spyrou   Kassimatis, and Galariotis (2007). The three authors studied the UK market for short-
term investor reaction for the period 1989 to 2004, and they showed that the market reaction to 
shocks for large capitalization stocks is consistent with the notion of market efficiency which 
suggests that information is incorporated instantaneously in prices. However, for medium and 
small capitalization stock portfolios, their results indicate significant under-reaction to market 
shocks whether they are positive or negative shocks. 
To sum up, the findings indicate that investors will not be able to profit from employing a 
momentum strategy, to benefit from the significant under-reaction to good or bad news that is to 
a great extent attributable to the “price momentum in the Egyptian Exchange in general and in 
the large market capitalization stocks listed in the Egyptian Exchange in specific, and this is due 
to the round-trip transaction costs that wipe-out any statistically significant profits. 
 
  
31 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The efficient market hypothesis is one of the basic foundations of standard finance. However, 
several scholars have challenged the efficiency of stock markets by presenting empirical 
evidence of stock market anomalies that seem to challenge the notion of market efficiency.  
While evidence of anomalies exists, what remains controversial is the question of “Can investors 
exploit these market anomalies to make superior profits?” As suggested by Kalb (2011), these 
anomalies can appear in the market in the form of over- and under-reaction that in turn lead to 
market inefficiency. The purpose of this study is to look for the existence of these anomalous 
reactions in the short term in the Egyptian Exchange. This study employs weekly closing prices 
data of all the stocks listed in the Egyptian Exchange as per 2014 list. All the data is obtained 
from Thomson- Reuters® Eikon. We use several different testing methodologies to evaluate the 
robustness of the results. 
This thesis extends current knowledge by assessing the short-term over/under-reaction 
phenomenon in the Egyptian Exchange for the period from 1998 to 2013. It produces no 
evidence of the presence of the overreaction effect for the specified test period, but on the 
contrary, our results seem to be supportive of the under-reaction hypothesis, that is robust to risk 
and non-risk control. It finds evidence of under-reaction hypothesis for the holding periods 
ranging from 1 to 4 weeks. 
Further, after examining the relationship between the under-reaction found and the size of the 
firm as being measured by the market capitalization, it shows that there exists a direct 
relationship between under-reaction and size of the firm especially for the holding periods from 1 
to 3 weeks. 
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"One possible explanation of our results on evidence of under-reaction, specifically in large sized 
stocks, might be attributed to institutional trading. Institutions on the Egyptian Stock Exchange 
concentrate their trading in large sized companies and tend to outperform individual investors 
both in the short and long term (Bassiouny & Tooma, 2013). It is also well documented that 
institutional investors are momentum traders (Griffin et al, 2003) and therefore under-reaction 
evidence might be attributed to institutional momentum trading strategies.   
 
Based on the findings and after previewing the main results and conclusions a strong evidence of 
under-reaction is found in the Egyptian Exchange and no evidence is found to support the 
overreaction hypothesis. Evidence of under-reaction suggests that a momentum strategy of 
buying winner stocks should results in profits. However, this anomaly could hardly be exploited 
to obtain abnormal returns after accounting for the round-trip transaction costs levied by the 
Egyptian Exchange. 
Future research on this topic may be done using a multivariate regression model that accounts for 
more variables that could affect over/under-reaction hypothesis. In addition, testing the 
over/under-reaction hypothesis in other Arab stock exchanges as well as analyze further factors 
that might contribute to the anomaly provide an avenue for future research.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A 
The following table shows all the stocks that are used in the sample, their Reuters code, and their 
date of listing as well as their market capitalization as of 7
th 
of May 2014 
Stocks Reuters Code Listing Date Market Capitalization 
  
  
  
   Banks   
Credit Agricole Egypt CIEB.CA 03/07/1996 4,104,100,000 
Al Baraka Bank Egypt SAUD.CA 25/12/1984 1,265,835,120 
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt - In US Dollars FAITA.CA 07/06/1995 2,481,245,651 
Qatar National Bank Alahly QNBA.CA 03/07/1996 15,812,498,436 
Union National Bank - Egypt " UNB-E UNBE.CA 05/11/1995 672,262,500 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) COMI.CA 02/02/1995 34,092,831,050 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank- Egypt ADIB.CA 19/06/1996 1,514,000,000 
Egyptian Gulf Bank EGBE.CA 17/11/1983 1,932,530,661 
El Watany Bank of Egypt WATA.CA 12/09/1994 2,464,000,000 
Suez Canal Bank CANA.CA 15/09/1982 994,000,000 
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt - In EGP FAIT.CA 07/06/1995 630,418,115 
  
  
  
  Basic Resources   
EL Ezz Aldekhela Steel - Alexandria IRAX.CA 17/09/1995 9,609,012,947 
Egypt Aluminum EGAL.CA 29/07/1997 2,165,000,000 
Egyptian Iron & Steel IRON.CA 13/11/1958 5,167,654,351 
Asek Company for Mining - Ascom ASCM.CA 08/10/2003 508,200,000 
Paper Middle East (Simo) SIMO.CA 01/04/1997 46,050,000 
Rakta Paper Manufacturing RAKT.CA 15/11/1994 217,800,000 
Ezz Steel ESRS.CA 25/05/1999 8,947,574,995 
  
  
  
  Chemicals   
Samad Misr -EGYFERT SMFR.CA 01/12/1999 58,080,000 
Abou Kir Fertilizers ABUK.CA 12/09/1994 13,796,507,872 
Misr Chemical Industries MICH.CA 03/08/1994 524,500,000 
Sidi Kerir Petrochemicals SKPC.CA 09/03/2005 10,200,750,000 
Egyptian Chemical Industries (Kima) EGCH.CA 16/08/1995 2,451,000,510 
Kafr El Zayat Pesticides KZPC.CA 01/08/1996 220,642,159 
Egyptian Financial & Industrial EFIC.CA 10/03/1996 821,224,339 
  
  
  
  Construction & Materials   
Delta Construction & Rebuilding DCRC.CA 12/09/1994 228,980,866 
Egyptian for Developing Building Materials EDBM.CA 11/08/1999 65,919,000 
Modern Company for water proofing (Bitumode) WATP.CA 24/12/2001 181,560,000 
Arab Valves Company ARVA.CA 14/02/2007 99,923,716 
Paint & Chemicals Industries (Pachin) PACH.CA 03/08/1994 824,400,000 
El Ezz Porcelain (Gemma) ECAP.CA 09/12/1998 266,967,792 
National Cement NCEM.CA 30/11/1995 1,726,536,000 
Torah Cement TORA.CA 30/03/1995 1,561,373,286 
Misr Beni Suef Cement MBSC.CA 11/08/1999 4,011,000,000 
Orascom Construction Industries (OCI) OCIC.CA 03/09/1998 59,087,784,893 
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Misr Conditioning (Miraco) MRCO.CA 07/04/1992 806,700,000 
Alexandria Cement ALEX.CA 27/09/1995 3,053,842,744 
Acrow Misr ACRO.CA 15/09/1982 286,504,594 
Giza General Contracting GGCC.CA 19/06/1997 470,205,015 
Upper Egypt Contracting UEGC.CA 07/05/1997 951,300,000 
Nasr Company for Civil Works NCCW.CA 07/12/1997 136,200,000 
Suez Cement SUCE.CA 08/02/1995 7,106,952,294 
Arab Ceramics (Aracemco) CERA.CA 07/04/1992 986,250,000 
Sinai Cement SCEM.CA 03/07/2000 2,449,300,000 
Misr Cement (Qena) MCQE.CA 24/05/2000 2,056,801,520 
South Valley Cement SVCE.CA 08/10/1998 3,886,990,130 
  
  
  
  Financial Services excluding Banks 
Arab Moltaka Investments Co AMIA.CA 14/12/1995 425,568,205 
Alexandria National Company for Financial Investment ANFI.CA 04/11/1998 34,772,375 
Grand Investment Capital GRCA.CA 19/08/2009 62,478,000 
Amer Group Holding AMER.CA 09/11/2010 5,684,232,322 
Export Development Bank of Egypt (EDBE) EXPA.CA 14/12/1995 1,291,680,000 
Mohandes Insurance MOIN.CA 07/05/1995 106,875,000 
El Kahera El Watania Investment KWIN.CA 08/09/1997 64,365,000 
Housing & Development Bank HDBK.CA 13/09/1983 2,185,000,000 
Delta Insurance DEIN.CA 03/07/1996 148,950,000 
Saudi Egyptian Investment & Finance SEIG.CA 07/04/1992 67,720,000 
Egyptians Abroad for Investment & Development ABRD.CA 30/09/1986 232,798,530 
Citadel Capital - Common Shares CCAP.CA 03/12/2009 5,508,000,000 
Arabia Investments,Development,Fin. Inv. Holding Comp.-Cash AIND.CA 03/06/2010 1,192,210,907 
Reacap Financial Investments REAC.CA 08/08/2006 370,145,876 
Al Arafa For Investment And Consultancies AIVC.CA 06/09/2006 790,584,300 
Naeem Holding NAHO.CA 16/11/2006 1,053,982,245 
Egyptian Arabian (cmar) Securities Brokerage EAC EASB.CA 17/01/2007 114,375,000 
Belton Financial Holding BTFH.CA. 09/04/2008 244,693,010 
Prime Holding PRMH.CA 23/04/2008 238,813,669 
El Orouba Securities Brokerage EOSB.CA 14/05/2008 27,195,000 
Pioneers Holding PIOH.CA 22/06/2008 6,655,000,000 
El Ahli Investment and Development AFDI.CA 28/05/1997 245,400,000 
Egyptian Financial Group-Hermes Holding Company HRHO.CA 10/02/1999 7,552,790,865 
Egyptian Kuwaiti Holding EKHO.CA 27/01/1999 6,408,392,122 
  
  
  
  Food & Beverage   
Atlas For Land Reclamation and Agricultural Proccssing ALRA.CA 07/11/2012 69,640,000 
Cairo Poultry POUL.CA 05/11/1995 1,922,973,696 
East Delta Flour Mills EDFM.CA 19/06/1996 263,700,000 
Upper Egypt Flour Mills UEFM.CA 01/08/1996 506,940,000 
Egyptian Starch & Glucose ESGI.CA 29/05/1996 441,366,345 
Middle Egypt Flour Mills CEFM.CA 27/03/1996 373,815,320 
Delta Sugar SUGR.CA 07/04/1992 1,576,976,652 
The Arab Dairy Products Co. ARAB DAIRY ADPC.CA 24/01/2001 453,600,000 
Northern Upper Egypt Development & Agricultural Production NEDA.CA 25/11/1998 34,890,000 
Juhayna Food Industries JUFO.CA 18/05/2010 8,077,255,598 
Ismailia National Food Industries INFI.CA 06/09/2010 107,370,000 
Ismailia Misr Poultry ISMA.CA 07/06/1995 269,617,913 
Mansourah Poultry MPCO.CA 02/02/1995 114,050,309 
International Agricultural Products IFAP.CA 23/12/1998 305,142,434 
Egypt for Poultry EPCO.CA 06/12/2001 119,196,000 
National company for maize products NCMP.CA 18/04/2006 783,855,665 
El Nasr For Manufacturing Agricultural Crops ELNA.CA 17/01/2007 150,858,909 
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North Cairo Mills MILS.CA 17/09/1995 301,312,000 
Bisco Misr BISM.CA 19/06/1997 701,500,000 
Alexandria Flour Mills AFMC.CA 01/04/1997 166,000,000 
Middle & West Delta Flour Mills WCDF.CA 11/05/1996 396,525,000 
South Cairo & Giza Mills & Bakeries SCFM.CA 11/05/1996 122,310,000 
Cairo Oils & Soap COSG.CA 05/05/1999 113,600,000 
Extracted Oils ZEOT.CA 17/09/1995 204,360,000 
Misr Oils & Soap MOSC.CA 01/08/1996 74,580,000 
Sharkia National Food SNFC.CA 27/02/1995 100,979,106 
  
  
  
  Healthcare & Pharmaceuticals 
Minapharm Pharmaceuticals MIPH.CA 11/01/2004 368,015,434 
Medical Union Pharmaceuticals MEDU.CA 22/04/1997 981,213,006 
Alexandria Pharmaceuticals AXPH.CA 27/02/1995 211,950,000 
Cairo Pharmaceuticals CPCI.CA 09/04/1996 301,674,375 
Nozha International Hospital NINH.CA 27/11/1997 79,940,000 
Cairo Medical Center MEDC.CA 24/07/2012 182,358,000 
Medical Packaging Company MEPA.CA 03/08/2011 43,520,000 
Egyptian International Pharmaceuticals (EIPICO) PHAR.CA 27/09/1995 4,046,156,400 
Glaxo Smith Kline BIOC.CA 23/10/1985 1,110,738,860 
Memphis Pharmaceuticals MPCI.CA 27/09/1995 89,943,750 
Nile Pharmaceuticals NIPH.CA 27/02/1995 152,381,250 
Arab Pharmaceuticals ADCI.CA 06/02/1996 74,479,500 
Advanced Pharmaceutical Packaging Co. (APP) APPC.CA 29/12/1999 62,698,855 
  
  
  
  Industrial Goods and Services and Automobiles 
Engineering Industries (ICON) ENGC.CA 19/02/1982 158,063,400 
Electro Cable Egypt ELEC.CA 30/03/1995 774,364,500 
Egyptian Transport (EGYTRANS) ETRS.CA 28/12/1992 228,475,500 
Alexandria Containers and goods ALCN.CA 16/08/1995 2,896,322,818 
El Ahram Co. For Printing And Packing EPPK.CA 03/02/2003 51,272,000 
ELSWEDY ELECTRIC SWDY.CA 18/05/2006 7,596,212,000 
Delta For Printing & Packaging DTPP.CA 21/05/2008 84,980,000 
Suez Bags SBAG.CA 07/04/1992 364,500,000 
El Arabia Engineering Industries EEII.CA 05/11/1995 55,873,171 
El Nasr Transformers (El Maco) NASR.CA 11/05/1996 334,156,690 
Canal Shipping Agencies CSAG.CA 27/02/1995 2,412,000,000 
Maridive & oil services MOIL.CA 07/04/1992 2,955,325,440 
United Arab Shipping UASG.CA 07/04/1992 268,000,000 
Modern Shorouk Printing & Packaging SMPP.CA 30/12/2002 164,358,000 
GB AUTO AUTO.CA 07/03/2007 4,638,855,471 
Universal For Paper and Packaging Materials (Unipack) UNIP.CA 11/10/1995 74,160,000 
  
  
  
  Oil & Gas   
GMC GROUP FOR INDUSTRIAL COMMERCIAL & FINANCIAL INVESTMENTS GMCI.CA 04/01/2006 53,549,969 
Alexandria Mineral Oils Company AMOC.CA 22/12/2004 6,918,996,000 
  
  
  
  Personal & Household Products 
El Nasr Clothes & Textiles (Kabo) KABO.CA 08/02/1995 362,315,822 
Eastern Tobacco EAST.CA 27/09/1995 8,300,000,000 
ARAB POLVARA SPINNING & WEAVING CO. APSW.CA 20/03/2002 327,902,960 
Alexandria Spinning & Weaving (SPINALEX) SPIN.CA 17/09/1995 426,474,084 
Nile Cotton Ginning NCGC.CA 25/09/1996 347,100,875 
Arab Cotton Ginning ACGC.CA 08/07/1995 1,631,265,827 
Oriental Weavers ORWE.CA 14/12/1994 4,195,800,000 
Ceramic & Porcelain PRCL.CA 10/03/1996 359,108,867 
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  Real Estate   
United Housing & Development UNIT.CA 14/12/1994 1,301,520,000 
Egyptians Housing Development & Reconstruction EHDR.CA 03/08/1994 340,195,432 
Gharbia Islamic Housing Development GIHD.CA 12/09/1994 46,462,500 
El Obour Real Estate Investment OBRI.CA 18/06/1998 29,348,000 
Six of October Development & Investment (SODIC) OCDI.CA 10/03/1998 2,195,274,385 
Palm Hills Development Company PHDC.CA 27/12/2006 5,757,326,400 
National Housing for Professional Syndicates NHPS.CA 30/03/1995 318,080,000 
El Kahera Housing ELKA.CA 30/03/1995 1,049,062,500 
El Shams Housing & Urbanization ELSH.CA 12/09/1995 508,000,000 
Development & Engineering Consultants DAPH.CA 19/06/1996 212,914,280 
Egyptian Real Estate Group Bearer Shares AREHA.CA 11/11/1998 12,167,785 
Egyptian Real Estate Group AREH.CA 16/02/1998 77,357,419 
Mena Touristic & Real Estate Investment MENA.CA 27/09/1995 170,250,000 
National Real Estate Bank for Development NRPD.CA 07/04/1992 122,603,453 
Heliopolis Housing HELI.CA 07/05/1995 3,625,868,889 
Medinet Nasr Housing MNHD.CA 07/05/1995 5,130,500,000 
International Co For Investment & Development ICID.CA 02/02/1985 91,170,000 
Ismailia Development and Real Estate Co IDRE.CA 16/06/2011 236,501,565 
North Africa Co. for Real Estate Investment NOAF.CA 26/03/2012 518,750,000 
General Company For Land Reclamation,Development & Reconstru AALR.CA 26/08/1996 196,992,600 
Gulf Canadian Real Estate Investment Co. CCRS.CA 30/12/2001 126,810,000 
Egyptians For Investment & Urban Development EIUD.CA 14/07/2011 204,000,000 
T M G Holding TMGH.CA 25/11/2007 18,468,882,460 
Arab Real Estate Investment CO.-ALICO RREI.CA 11/08/2011 308,000,000 
  
  
  
  Retail   
Cairo Educational Services CAED.CA 11/09/2000 60,504,000 
Assiut Islamic Trading AITG.CA 18/01/1996 40,918,176 
Misr Duty Free Shops MFSC.CA 19/06/1996 306,562,500 
General Silos & Storage GSSC.CA 29/05/1996 168,800,000 
  
  
  
  Media   
Egyptian Media Production City MPRC.CA 26/09/1999 841,957,200 
  
  
  
  Technology   
Egyptian Satellites (NileSat) EGSA.CA 09/12/1998 2,193,662,093 
Sues Canal Company For Technology Settling SCTS.CA 31/03/2004 1,271,691,000 
Raya Holding For Technology And Communications RAYA.CA 12/05/2005 578,012,284 
  
  
  
  Telecommunications   
Global Telecom Holding GTHE.CA 13/01/1999 27,802,160,286 
Telecom Egypt ETEL.CA 29/12/1999 25,042,740,372 
Egyptian Company for Mobile Services (MobiNil) EMOB.CA 10/05/1998 12,343,000,000 
Orascom Telecom Media And Technology Holding OTMT.CA 02/01/2012 6,819,397,806 
  
  
  
  Travel & Leisure   
Orascom Hotels And Development ORHD.CA 18/06/1998 4,312,727,955 
El Wadi Co. For Touristic Investement ELWA.CA 06/09/2012 282,600,000 
Rowad Tourism (Al Rowad) ROTO.CA 28/10/1998 155,286,846 
Remco for Touristic Villages Construction RTVC.CA 21/10/1998 887,330,971 
Pyramisa Hotels PHTV.CA 18/02/1997 324,129,885 
Egyptian for Tourism Resorts EGTS.CA 10/02/1999 1,942,500,000 
TransOceans Tours TRTO.CA 02/12/1998 98,070,000 
Misr Hotels MHOT.CA 15/11/1994 270,600,000 
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Orascom Development Holding (AG) ODHN.CA 03/12/2009 3,333,839,570 
Marsa Marsa Alam For Tourism Development MMAT.CA 06/09/2012 100,800,000 
Sharm Dreams Co. for Tourism Investment SDTI.CA 18/10/2000 585,000,000 
Tourism Urbanization TOUR.CA 05/11/1995 53,349,020 
  
  
  
  Utilities   
Natural Gas & Mining Project (Egypt Gas) EGAS.CA 07/04/1992 771,240,000 
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Appendix B 
The following table shows the stocks included in the sample, their average return, their average 
risk, their average trading volume, and their average value traded of each over the sample 
Stock Average Return Average Risk Average Trading Volume Average Value Traded 
  
   
  
CIEB.CA 0.0087 0.1781                              655,591.04                       7,767,109.28  
SAUD.CA 0.0022 0.0674                              803,839.52                       5,703,437.35  
FAITA.CA 0.0030 0.0536                                77,054.10                          345,191.50  
QNBA.CA 0.0042 0.0496                              959,922.28                    13,122,858.76  
UNBE.CA 0.0041 0.0907                              168,123.70                       1,064,609.81  
COMI.CA 0.0038 0.0493                          9,961,955.20                  102,343,560.85  
ADIB.CA 0.0028 0.0733                          1,096,271.46                       8,016,102.94  
EGBE.CA 0.0010 0.0574                              449,111.13                          602,093.49  
WATA.CA 0.0026 0.0633                              572,095.33                       8,260,237.40  
CANA.CA 0.0007 0.0622                              130,684.91                       1,823,067.01  
FAIT.CA 0.0061 0.0664                                55,037.76                       1,206,007.07  
IRAX.CA 0.0035 0.0564                                40,765.40                    26,148,675.57  
EGAL.CA 0.0021 0.0729                              128,779.01                       3,852,004.93  
IRON.CA 0.0054 0.0965                              509,456.11                       9,190,283.69  
ASCM.CA 0.0155 0.2350                              766,725.17                       9,191,715.62  
SIMO.CA 0.0026 0.0853                                44,782.66                          527,153.01  
RAKT.CA 0.0047 0.0955                              206,054.26                       2,237,381.59  
ESRS.CA 0.0042 0.0774                          5,960,803.78                    71,877,534.79  
SMFR.CA 0.0017 0.0798                              749,619.16                       5,848,832.32  
ABUK.CA 0.0024 0.0426                              107,975.17                    10,163,878.76  
MICH.CA 0.0021 0.0692                              792,488.25                       7,661,105.97  
SKPC.CA 0.0013 0.0491                          3,888,822.90                    36,630,705.30  
EGCH.CA 0.0068 0.0855                              322,335.68                       2,830,665.52  
KZPC.CA 0.0033 0.0841                                26,784.50                          718,008.39  
EFIC.CA 0.0020 0.0583                          1,094,923.41                    19,967,364.77  
DCRC.CA 0.0028 0.0811                              564,348.13                       3,938,180.48  
EDBM.CA 0.0075 0.1138                              574,028.82                       5,230,909.37  
WATP.CA -0.0007 0.0809                          3,304,793.66                       1,632,636.61  
ARVA.CA 0.0003 0.0839                          1,313,986.09                          847,619.61  
PACH.CA 0.0010 0.0498                              123,172.28                       4,338,062.06  
ECAP.CA 0.0022 0.0785                          1,325,060.51                       8,799,119.22  
NCEM.CA 0.0021 0.0718                                91,141.96                       1,842,648.92  
TORA.CA 0.0013 0.0552                              215,498.25                       4,720,297.10  
MBSC.CA 0.0049 0.0528                              477,242.53                       4,899,554.49  
OCIC.CA 0.0066 0.0550                          1,188,862.66                  112,870,220.40  
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MRCO.CA 0.0038 0.0680                                31,685.69                       1,085,816.02  
ALEX.CA 0.0062 0.0999                              593,546.87                       2,688,362.31  
ACRO.CA 0.0047 0.0727                                77,025.44                       1,224,081.85  
GGCC.CA 0.0049 0.0858                              767,756.54                       6,509,807.87  
UEGC.CA 0.0068 0.0896                        16,178,701.24                    22,527,222.47  
NCCW.CA 0.0033 0.0824                                45,544.35                       1,513,023.32  
SUCE.CA 0.0010 0.0508                              328,644.53                       9,735,749.04  
CERA.CA 0.0062 0.0718                              113,009.47                       1,648,590.84  
SCEM.CA 0.0034 0.0530                              443,585.37                       7,225,310.16  
MCQE.CA 0.0035 0.0405                              150,729.75                       5,607,802.04  
SVCE.CA 0.0082 0.0759                          4,849,733.86                    23,146,675.52  
AMIA.CA -0.0004 0.0838                              192,846.30                       2,253,752.31  
ANFI.CA 0.0040 0.0875                                39,026.20                          218,680.66  
GRCA.CA 0.0004 0.0709                              206,161.42                          704,396.19  
AMER.CA -0.0039 0.0652                        42,233,156.59                       6,863,764.99  
EXPA.CA 0.0015 0.0556                              438,620.24                       4,375,884.11  
MOIN.CA 0.0017 0.0643                                17,263.73                          354,912.19  
KWIN.CA 0.0024 0.0993                                95,082.19                          332,260.57  
HDBK.CA 0.0030 0.0702                              358,819.01                       9,213,970.48  
DEIN.CA 0.0018 0.0634                              149,406.74                       1,279,862.37  
SEIG.CA 0.0106 0.0874                                   2,574.80                          120,488.27  
ABRD.CA 0.0048 0.0949                          1,497,623.81                    11,752,606.81  
CCAP.CA -0.0026 0.0687                        15,046,201.40                    17,199,663.00  
AIND.CA -0.0001 0.1004                        16,168,967.31                    18,180,209.01  
REAC.CA -0.0074 0.1266                              341,185.78                          179,895.90  
AIVC.CA -0.0019 0.0528                          2,935,652.43                          634,811.60  
NAHO.CA -0.0022 0.0690                          3,813,181.67                       1,533,270.04  
EASB.CA -0.0068 0.0756                          1,141,116.63                          426,381.27  
BTFH.CA. 0.0075 0.0709                              217,135.07                          342,715.97  
PRMH.CA -0.0031 0.0811                              727,518.18                          789,664.26  
EOSB.CA 0.0098 0.1375                              537,840.01                          255,865.98  
PIOH.CA 0.0010 0.0978                        16,806,712.39                    37,198,859.20  
AFDI.CA 0.0017 0.0775                              702,465.44                    16,148,367.04  
HRHO.CA 0.0034 0.0777                        12,302,925.92                  192,729,108.49  
EKHO.CA 0.0031 0.0683                          3,947,432.58                       5,954,396.19  
ALRA.CA 0.0192 0.1272                                90,909.66                          165,289.77  
POUL.CA 0.0039 0.0632                              546,621.22                       3,580,814.88  
EDFM.CA 0.0012 0.0539                                57,526.44                       1,797,136.97  
UEFM.CA 0.0016 0.0550                                71,309.25                       4,140,957.26  
ESGI.CA 0.0034 0.0762                              192,339.34                       1,960,561.82  
CEFM.CA 0.0019 0.0676                              163,014.49                       2,887,191.85  
SUGR.CA 0.0009 0.0761                              437,446.49                       5,725,176.71  
ADPC.CA 0.0249 0.3281                                59,912.96                       1,155,374.54  
46 
 
NEDA.CA 0.0096 0.1024                              470,783.48                       3,810,891.80  
JUFO.CA 0.0277 0.2639                          5,772,485.43                       6,089,507.52  
INFI.CA 0.0106 0.1159                              223,588.82                       1,527,179.65  
ISMA.CA 0.0131 0.0988                              284,157.41                          704,659.21  
MPCO.CA 0.0073 0.0932                              227,293.05                       2,431,677.36  
IFAP.CA 0.0136 0.1799                          1,791,342.03                       6,628,410.68  
EPCO.CA 0.0083 0.0935                          2,863,411.02                       7,840,664.66  
NCMP.CA 0.0069 0.1120                              620,442.50                       3,930,313.40  
ELNA.CA 0.0070 0.1014                              300,016.76                       2,880,098.57  
MILS.CA 0.0003 0.0668                              107,662.55                       3,647,131.89  
BISM.CA 0.0039 0.0561                                65,074.95                       1,339,498.21  
AFMC.CA 0.0014 0.0764                                39,355.02                          849,714.53  
WCDF.CA 0.0011 0.0558                                63,745.59                       2,187,644.23  
SCFM.CA 0.0022 0.0762                                30,258.71                       1,108,603.78  
COSG.CA 0.0015 0.0784                                71,103.26                       1,049,355.25  
ZEOT.CA 0.0023 0.0777                          4,635,815.68                    10,056,779.90  
MOSC.CA 0.0027 0.0763                                81,422.53                       1,492,377.30  
SNFC.CA 0.0117 0.1162                          1,138,209.41                       3,451,380.28  
MIPH.CA -0.0009 0.0755                                40,881.53                          552,003.41  
MEDU.CA 0.0021 0.0671                                56,712.35                       1,259,163.22  
AXPH.CA 0.0019 0.0460                                   8,262.24                          326,572.82  
CPCI.CA 0.0017 0.0491                                30,107.86                          620,101.30  
NINH.CA 0.0074 0.0794                                34,279.54                          445,586.39  
MEDC.CA 0.0095 0.0697                                11,156.63                             22,255.88  
MEPA.CA -0.0102 0.0826                          6,921,184.37                       1,243,456.86  
PHAR.CA 0.0024 0.0418                              282,592.43                       5,469,780.56  
BIOC.CA 0.0054 0.0893                              135,095.25                       1,665,645.64  
MPCI.CA 0.0024 0.0669                                   9,559.65                          263,121.91  
NIPH.CA 0.0039 0.0574                                10,079.50                          173,938.87  
ADCI.CA 0.0028 0.0657                                15,276.14                          285,964.30  
APPC.CA -0.0025 0.0809                              539,258.97                       1,609,868.73  
ENGC.CA 0.0049 0.0795                              466,504.46                       3,887,309.90  
ELEC.CA 0.0029 0.0937                        20,678,485.63                    23,621,925.48  
ETRS.CA 0.0035 0.0898                              629,481.91                       6,230,674.18  
ALCN.CA 0.0075 0.0786                                36,327.91                       3,680,012.13  
EPPK.CA 0.0042 0.0766                                94,067.73                          780,898.65  
SWDY.CA 0.0025 0.0578                          1,365,960.49                    24,503,526.35  
DTPP.CA 0.0164 0.2194                                35,022.62                          341,323.65  
SBAG.CA -0.0005 0.0683                                   1,841.65                          129,032.36  
EEII.CA 0.0005 0.0655                                53,643.04                          248,031.10  
NASR.CA 0.0042 0.1009                              365,941.71                       3,613,452.32  
CSAG.CA 0.0052 0.0906                              955,983.37                    10,222,002.18  
MOIL.CA 0.0022 0.0998                          3,161,675.94                       2,138,205.40  
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UASG.CA 0.0060 0.1270                          3,938,567.27                       8,203,674.16  
SMPP.CA 0.0075 0.1015                                52,999.08                          491,123.33  
AUTO.CA 0.0014 0.0610                              503,183.38                       6,902,198.03  
UNIP.CA 0.0035 0.1051                              341,258.18                       2,639,386.26  
GMCI.CA 0.0097 0.0963                          1,686,695.12                       3,109,140.32  
AMOC.CA 0.0002 0.0422                              435,660.35                    16,193,582.41  
KABO.CA 0.0028 0.0835                        10,738,248.91                    15,433,368.85  
EAST.CA 0.0023 0.0435                              159,088.33                    14,471,197.61  
APSW.CA 0.0030 0.0849                          4,893,549.32                    26,287,414.05  
SPIN.CA 0.0383 1.0289                          4,333,380.65                    10,481,290.54  
NCGC.CA 0.0021 0.1026                          3,669,305.16                    23,447,998.81  
ACGC.CA 0.0022 0.0933                        11,664,946.66                    65,751,347.76  
ORWE.CA 0.0025 0.0501                              377,321.63                    13,305,571.38  
PRCL.CA 0.0074 0.1035                          1,017,725.81                       6,357,340.75  
UNIT.CA 0.0052 0.0747                          1,971,492.50                    11,334,187.58  
EHDR.CA 0.0109 0.1356                          4,553,414.39                    12,071,890.68  
GIHD.CA 0.0099 0.1050                              220,625.76                       1,936,326.23  
OBRI.CA -0.0024 0.0703                                89,664.50                          147,372.91  
OCDI.CA 0.0081 0.1217                              990,517.08                    35,236,623.17  
PHDC.CA 0.2219 3.7964                        37,914,114.10                    28,644,897.42  
NHPS.CA 0.0078 0.1064                                30,437.24                          490,236.51  
ELKA.CA 0.0036 0.0741                          4,527,126.25                    21,661,502.45  
ELSH.CA 0.0037 0.0806                          1,336,754.71                       5,586,859.04  
DAPH.CA 0.0032 0.0798                              345,500.53                       5,246,582.72  
AREHA.CA 0.0080 0.1254                                39,507.09                          616,908.28  
AREH.CA 0.0027 0.1120                              376,149.52                       2,688,958.62  
MENA.CA 0.0019 0.0807                          1,252,458.16                       5,552,718.49  
NRPD.CA 0.0129 0.1246                              642,292.11                       4,872,973.81  
HELI.CA 0.0029 0.0756                              565,226.45                    17,418,071.37  
MNHD.CA 0.0035 0.0779                          1,463,950.31                    28,144,593.90  
ICID.CA 0.0123 0.1149                              118,656.71                       1,522,389.12  
IDRE.CA 0.0017 0.0901                              568,137.54                          771,198.08  
NOAF.CA 0.0076 0.1391                              430,667.63                          152,418.92  
AALR.CA 0.0131 0.1656                                80,757.89                       1,201,086.50  
CCRS.CA 0.0071 0.1023                              212,383.22                       3,117,627.04  
EIUD.CA 0.0057 0.1063                          2,995,420.72                       3,416,737.47  
TMGH.CA -0.0001 0.0671                        32,833,463.66                    73,152,724.11  
RREI.CA -0.0004 0.1023                        10,139,443.22                       8,250,981.15  
CAED.CA 0.0056 0.0777                                17,260.78                          107,441.91  
AITG.CA 0.0032 0.0831                              335,267.66                       1,442,697.92  
MFSC.CA 0.0047 0.1115                              340,732.31                       1,045,334.69  
GSSC.CA 0.0003 0.0706                                71,027.28                       2,799,758.35  
MPRC.CA 0.0008 0.0835                          2,801,467.02                    29,872,497.93  
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EGSA.CA 0.0022 0.0571                                27,640.26                             92,528.66  
SCTS.CA 0.0028 0.0587                              307,488.02                       2,030,553.68  
RAYA.CA -0.0002 0.0711                          3,190,820.97                    13,731,221.22  
GTHE.CA 0.0054 0.0754                        39,038,788.38                    92,623,953.36  
ETEL.CA 0.0003 0.0484                          7,458,054.37                    61,903,274.63  
EMOB.CA 0.0100 0.1351                              711,522.31                    75,679,516.17  
OTMT.CA 0.0161 0.0596                      171,202,355.78                       8,201,263.07  
ORHD.CA 0.0044 0.0898                          1,411,811.58                    23,221,744.59  
ELWA.CA 0.0051 0.0833                              537,210.46                          573,507.15  
ROTO.CA 0.0040 0.0893                              193,423.63                       2,029,671.56  
RTVC.CA -0.0005 0.0719                          3,668,006.65                    11,562,030.53  
PHTV.CA 0.0014 0.0636                                73,361.72                       1,205,181.54  
EGTS.CA 0.0063 0.0998                        24,396,252.57                    52,837,194.02  
TRTO.CA 0.0162 0.1283                          1,881,370.82                          235,238.02  
MHOT.CA 0.0010 0.0623                                13,897.81                          587,831.62  
ODHN.CA -0.0047 0.0801                              106,352.53                       3,576,072.62  
MMAT.CA 0.0252 0.1170                          1,634,294.10                          318,055.07  
SDTI.CA 0.0027 0.0850                              160,941.01                       1,298,948.61  
TOUR.CA 0.0002 0.0755                                61,347.13                          584,448.52  
EGAS.CA 0.0004 0.0547                                43,113.94                       3,477,493.28  
 
 
 
